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Abstract. Information flow techniques typically classify information ac-
cording to suitable security levels and enforce policies that are based on
binary relations between individual levels, e.g., stating that information
is allowed to flow from one level to another. We argue that some infor-
mation flow properties of interest naturally require coordination patterns
that involve sets of security levels rather than individual levels: some se-
cret information could be safely disclosed to a set of confidential channels
of incomparable security levels, with individual leaks considered instead
illegal; a group of competing agencies might agree to disclose their se-
crets, with individual disclosures being undesired, etc. Motivated by this
we propose a simple language for expressing information flow policies
where the usual admitted flow relation between individual security lev-
els is replaced by a relation between sets of security levels, thus allowing
to capture coordinated flows of information. The flow of information is
expressed in terms of causal dependencies and the satisfaction of a policy
is defined with respect to an event structure that is assumed to capture
the causal structure of system computations. We suggest applications to
secret exchange protocols, program security and security architectures,
and discuss the relation to classic notions of information flow control.
Keywords: Information Flow, Coordination, Concurrency, Declassification,
Non-Interference, Causality, Event Structures.
1 Introduction
As the number of interconnected devices increases, the focus on security-related
aspects of coordinated computations gains more and more relevance and appeal.
Techniques for controlling and enforcing the flow of information need to be ap-
plied, and possibly extended to deal with coordination aspects. Typically, the
entities of a system are assigned a security level, and information flow policies
prescribe which interactions are legal and which are forbidden. This is normally
expressed via a relation that models the admitted flows between security levels.
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Motivation and Problem Statement. The information flow relations used in the
literature to model policies are almost invariably binary relations between in-
dividual security levels. This paper is motivated by the observation that some
desired information flow properties naturally involve suitable coordinated sets
of security levels rather than mere individual levels.
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Fig. 1. Information flow example.
For example, some secret information
(say, owned by a government agency E, cf.
Figure 1) could be safely disclosed to a set
of confidential channels of incomparable
security levels (say, corresponding to com-
peting investors C and D) simultaneously,
with individual leaks considered instead
illegal or unfair. This is for instance, the
spirit of U.S. security and exchange com-
mission’s regulation fair disclosure [22].
Dually, a group of competing companies
(say A and B in Figure 1) may agree to
collectively disclose their secrets (say to the government agency E), with indi-
vidual disclosures being undesired. This paper is motivated by such scenarios
and, in general, by the following question: what is a natural notion of informa-
tion flow policies that regulate flows among sets of security levels?
Contributions. We address the question by proposing a simple policy specifi-
cation language that extends the usual security diagrams by allowing relations
between sets of security levels instead of just single levels. The clauses in our
policies are of the form A1, . . . ,Am  B1, . . . ,Bn, intuitively meaning that the
security levels A1, . . . ,Am are allowed to coordinate in order to let information
flow to security levels B1, . . . ,Bn.
In our approach the flow of information between entities is captured in terms
of the existence of causal dependencies between events representing occurrences
of actions of such entities. In particular, we use event structures [16,25] as a
reference semantic model. The idea is that causal dependencies between events
represent the transfer of some information. Thus causal dependencies are re-
quired to obey to coordination patterns as prescribed by the information flow
policy. For traditional intransitive binary policies any flow of information, i.e.,
any (direct) causality a < b between events a and b needs to be allowed by
the policy, i.e., if the level of a is A and the level of b is B then the policy
has to include a clause A  B. We generalise this to many-to-many policies by
requiring that any direct causality a < b is part of a possibly more complex
interaction that conforms to a coordination pattern allowed by the policy, i.e.,
if A1 and B1 are the security levels of a and b, respectively, there must exist
a clause A1,A2 . . .An  B1,B2, . . . ,Bm in the policy and events a1, a2, . . . , an,
b1, b2, . . . , bm (with b equal to some bk) such that each event ai has level Ai, each
event bj has level Bj , and events a1, . . . an are (suitably coordinated) causes of
the events b1, . . . , bm.
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As an example, consider the diagram of Figure 1, where arrows represent
direct causalities between events and the security levels coincide with the prin-
cipals. For events we use the notation name : level. The direct causality from
event disclose : A to event collect : E is allowed by the policy A, B  E since
collect : E is also causally dependent on disclose : B, thus providing some guar-
antee of the fact that A and B disclose their secrets collectively. Analogously, the
direct causality from disclose : E to collect : C is allowed by the policy E A,B
since there is a causality relation from disclose : E to collect : D as well, yielding
some sort of simultaneity in the disclosure of the secrets from E to C, D.
We study several properties of our policy language. In particular, we observe
that checking whether a system satisfies a policy is decidable for a general class
of event structures, the so-called regular trace event structures [24]. As a matter
of fact, policy satisfaction is expressible as a first-order property and the corre-
sponding model checking problem is decidable [12]. We also discuss the relation
with classical notions of information flow control, including non-interference and
declassification, and suggest applications beyond secret exchange protocols, in-
cluding program security and routing in security architectures.
Synopsis. Section 2 introduces several motivating examples, including a running
example that is used throughout the paper. Section 3 provides some technical
background on event structures. Section 4 presents the policy language, the
notion of policy satisfaction and a decidability result. Section 5 compares with
notions of information flow based on interleaving semantics, in particular with
trace- and bisimulation-based non-interference. Section 6 discusses other related
works. Section 7 concludes our paper and outlines future research.
2 Motivating Examples
We introduce here some examples that have motivated our work and that we
envisage as application domains for many-to-many information flow analysis.
put〈secA〉@AB : A
get〈?sec〉@AB : B
put〈secB〉@BA : B
get〈?sec〉@BA : A
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(a) Protocol P1
put〈secA〉@AE : A put〈secB〉@BE : B
gather〈?sec1,?sec21,?sec2〉@AE,BE : E
scatter〈sec2,sec1〉@EA,EB : E
get〈?sec〉@EA : A get〈?sec〉@EB : B
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(b) Protocol P2
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(c) Policy
Fig. 2. Two secret exchange protocols and a security policy.
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Simultaneous Secret Exchange. Consider first the problem of exchanging a secret
between two parties, say Alice and Bob. We shall use this as a running example
throughout the paper. A way to solve the problem would be to proceed accord-
ing to the protocol in Figure 2a, where Alice starts sending her secret to Bob,
which then replies with his own secret. The graphical representation (techni-
cally a security-labelled event structure) will be explained later. Here it suffices
to understand that the figure represents the structure of the communication in
an execution, where an event put〈m〉@C : P, represents party P sending m on
channel C, and an event get〈t〉@C : P, represents party P receiving a message
from channel C to be saved according to the pattern t (binding/formal fields be-
ing denoted with a leading question mark “?”). Arrows represent (direct) causal
dependencies between events. The protocol has essentially the same structure
of classical key exchange protocols [14] and does not solve one of the main con-
cerns of the so-called simultaneous secret exchange problem, which is to avoid or
minimise competitive advantage among the parties exchanging the secrets (see
e.g. [17]). If we assume to deal with information of two security levels (one for
each party), a standard approach to information flow does not help much in this
scenario, as we can just allow flows between Alice and Bob (and thus accept any
protocol with no guarantee) or forbid them (and thus reject all protocols).
One standard solution to the simultaneous secret exchange problem is to use
an intermediary (say Eve). Many-to-many information flow policies can be used
to specify some desired properties of intermediary-based protocols. For example,
we may require that the intermediary forwards information to Alice and Bob si-
multaneously (denoted by an information flow policy Eve Alice,Bob), and that
the intermediary accepts information from Alice and Bob only if collectively dis-
closed (denoted by an information flow policy by Alice,Bob Eve). A graphical
representation for this security policy, that will be refined and explained in detail
later, can be found in Figure 2c. The protocol sketched in Figure 2b, which uses
multi-party interactions, satisfies the desired information flow properties. The
protocol uses in particular an MPI-like gather operation to (point-wise) collect a
list messages from different sources, and MPI-like scatter operation to piece-wise
broadcast the list of secrets.
put〈secA〉@AB : A put〈secB〉@BA : B
get〈?sec〉@BA : A get〈?sec〉@AB : B
**TTT
TTTT
TTTT
ttjjjj
jjjj
jjj
 
(a) Protocol P3
A B
KKK sss
OO OO
(b) Policy
Fig. 3. A secret exchange protocol satisfying a policy without intermediary.
We shall see that the causality approach to information flow allows one to
provide stronger guarantees on secret exchange protocols, by only admitting in-
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formation to flow collectively and simultaneously between Alice and Bob, namely,
Alice,Bob Alice,Bob (see Figure 3b, for a graphical representation), even with-
out intermediaries. This is realised by the protocol in Figure 3a, where vertical
and cross dependencies are control and data dependencies, respectively.
Language-Based Security and Declassification. We use a classic problem of de-
classification in access control to illustrate how our approach can be used to
check information flow properties in the traditional sense [20], and how our poli-
cies can be used to specify several useful forms of declassification [13,21]. The
access control program below, on the left, written in a simple imperative pro-
gramming language in the style of [20], is checking a password and preparing a
reply to the user in a variable display. A causal semantics to the program can be
given based on the following idea: (i) events correspond to variable updates or
initialisations, (ii) an update x := e causally depends on previous updates of all
variables in e or their initialisation, (iii) if a control point is conditioned by y
then all updates in all branches of the control causally depend on the latest up-
date of y (or its initialisation), and (iv) conflict relations (represented as dotted
lines) capture branching. For the program at hand, the resulting event structure
can be found on the right.
if downgrade then
if check(user,password) then
display := “ok”;
log := log , 〈user,“ok”〉;
else
display :=“ko”;
log :=log , 〈user,“ko”〉;
downgrade := ...password := ... user := ...
display := “ok” display := “ko”
log := log , 〈user,“ok”〉 log := log , 〈user,“ko”〉
 ,,YYYYY
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Disregarding whether the password is correct or not, there is a flow of infor-
mation concerning the password to the user, represented as a causality relation
from the latest update of the password to the updates of variable display.
For simplicity assume that each variable has its own security level, coinciding
with the variable name. A standard security type system would consider the
program to be insecure and our approach would agree on that in absence of
a policy password  display allowing the leaks. Of course, such a policy is not
desirable in general (e.g. the user may be malicious). However, the program
provides some guarantees that make it acceptable from the security point of view.
First, the reply is also influenced by a check on variable downgrade, which may be
used to disable login (e.g. after several unsuccessful attempts). This provides a
standard form of controlled declassification. Requiring that the declassification
is controlled as desired can be done through a policy password, downgrade  
display. In addition, the program above is using a log to keep track of logging
attempts. This provides the additional desirable property that password leaks
are only possible when the information concerning the access attempt also flows
to the log (denoted user, password display, log).
Security architectures. A third motivating case are systems where information of
different security levels needs to traverse shared resources, like a routing network.
An archetypal example is the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS)
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architecture [19]. The diagram on the left of the figure below depicts a simplified
version of such an architecture, inspired by the case study of [11]. Information
from security level A (resp. B) should be allowed to flow into C (resp. D) only.
Messages are routed through a common network made of a multiplexer com-
ponent (M) that accepts messages from both A and B and forwards it to a
demultiplexer component (W), which dispatches the messages either to C or to
D, according to routing information.
A B
M
W
C D
6
66


 6
66
A B
M
W
C D
6
66


l R
 
The diagram on the left of the figure
can be also seen as an information flow pol-
icy (isomorphic to the architecture) aiming
at enforcing the desired flows. The problem
of this naive policy is that it allows also
for undesired flows, e.g., from A to D and
from B to C, indirectly through the network:
a protocol wrongly routing the information
would be admitted by the policy. Consider
instead a policy where individual flows from
W to C and D are not allowed, and instead,
they need to be collectively produced with A
and B, respectively (denoted A,W  C and
B,W  D). The new policy (sketched on the right of the figure) would reject
protocols wrongly routing the messages.
3 Event Structures
We model the causal behaviour of a system with prime event structures [16,25], a
well-studied semantic model of concurrency where causality is a primitive notion.
The way in which an event structure is associated to a specific formalism will
depend on the system features one intends to capture (data/control flow, etc.).
Definition 1 (event structure). An event structure E = 〈E,≤,#〉 consists
of a set E of events, a partial order relation ≤ ⊆ E×E called causality, and an
irreflexive symmetric relation # ⊆ E × E called conflict such that:
(i) for all e ∈ E the set of causes [e] = {e′ ∈ E | e′ ≤ e} is finite (finitariness);
(ii) for all e, e′, e′′ ∈ E, if e#e′ and e′ ≤ e′′ then e#e′′ (conflict inheritance).
For e, e′ ∈ E we write e < e′ (e is a proper cause of e′) if e ≤ e′ and e 6= e′.
We say that e is a direct cause of e′ (denoted el e′) if e < e′ and for all e′′ ∈ E
if e ≤ e′′ ≤ e′ either e′′ = e or e′′ = e′. The causes of a set of events X ⊆ E are
defined as [X] =
⋃
e∈X [e]. We lift causality to sets of events, with a universal
interpretation, i.e., for X,Y ⊆ E, we write X < Y (resp. X lY ) if for all e ∈ X
and e′ ∈ Y we have e < e′ (resp. el e′). For e ∈ E we define the set of its proper
causes as [e) = [e] \ {e}. We say that e, e′ ∈ E are in direct conflict, written
e#µe
′, when e#e′ and for all e′′ ∈ [e) it holds ¬(e′′#e′) and for all e′′′ ∈ [e′) it
holds ¬(e#e′′′), i.e., the conflict is not inherited.
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Fig. 4. Configurations of the event structure in Figure 3a.
Figures 2a–3a show three event structures corresponding to different proto-
cols in our running example. The set of events correspond to communication
operations, and are annotated with the initials of the principal executing the
action (which is actually the security level assigned to the event, as we shall
explain later). Causality is represented graphically by directed arrows, while
conflict (to be seen in subsequent examples) is represented by dotted undirected
lines. For the sake of a lighter notation, we follow the tradition of depicting direct
causalities and conflicts only.
Event structures describe the possible events in computations and their mu-
tual relations. When e < e′ then e must necessarily occur before e′, while if
e#e′ then the occurrence of e excludes e′ (and vice versa). Computations are
characterised as conflict-free sets of events, containing the causes of all events.
Definition 2 (configuration). Let E = 〈E,≤,#〉 be an event structure. A
configuration of E is a subset C ⊆ E such that ¬(e#e′) for all e, e′ ∈ C and
[C] = C. The set of configurations of E is denoted C(E).
For any event e, the causes [e] and the proper causes [e) are configurations.
Figure 4 depicts all the configurations of the event structure of Figure 3a.
They are related by arrows that represent transitions, i.e., how a configuration
can be extended to another configuration by adding an event.
Definition 3 (extension). Let E = 〈E,≤,#〉 be an event structure, and let
C ∈ C(E). We say that an event e extends C when e 6∈ C and C ∪ {e} ∈ C(E).
In this situation we write C ⊕ e for C ∪ {e}. The set of possible extensions of a
configuration C is PE(C) = {e ∈ E | C ⊕ e ∈ C(E)}.
The transition system semantics of an event structure is obtained considering
configurations as states and extensions as transitions.
Definition 4 (transition system). The transition system of an event struc-
ture E = 〈E,≤,#〉 is the tuple TS (E) = 〈C(E), {C → C⊕e | C ∈ C(E)∧e ∈ E}〉.
The diagram of Figure 4 represents the transition system of the event struc-
ture in Figure 3a. When events carry a label, the above definition yields labelled
transition systems with transitions C
a→ C ⊕ e, where a is the label of e.
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4 Many-to-Many Information Flow Policies
We introduce here our notion of many-to-many information flow policies, which
describe the legal interactions among sets of security levels. Section 4.1 presents
the policy language, Section 4.2 defines the semantics, Section 4.3 studies some
of its properties, and Section 4.4 provides a decidability result.
4.1 A Policy Language for Many-to-Many Information Flows
We start by introducing the syntax of many-to-many information flow policies.
Definition 5 (many-to-many information flow policy). Let L be a finite
set of security levels and C = {d, f} be a set of coordination constraints. A
many-to-many multi-level information flow policy is a pair Π = 〈L , 〉 where
 ⊆ 2L × 2C × 2L and (A, ∅,A) ∈ for all A ∈ L . We denote by P the set of
all policies.
We will write A σ B for (A, σ,B) ∈ , often dropping brackets from σ, A and
B. Security levels in L are ranged over by A,B, . . . and sets of security levels are
ranged over by A,B, . . .. The requirement that A  A for all A ∈ L is natural
in information flow: information is always allowed to flow within the same level
of security. Finiteness of the set of security levels L is a natural assumption. It
could be meaningful to allow L to be infinite only when security levels can be
generated dynamically. The theory in the paper could be adapted trivially apart
from the decidability result in Section 4.4, that relies on regularity of the model
which in turn implies the finiteness of L .
Note that an information flow policy can be seen as a directed hyper-graph
whose hyper-arcs are labelled by (possibly empty) subsets of the alphabet of
coordination constraints C (to be explained later). This analogy is exploited in
the visual representation of security policies.
Informally, a clause A σ B specifies that a group of entities whose set of
security levels is A is allowed to influence a group of entities whose set of security
levels is B, subject to the coordination constraints in σ. E.g., a policy
Alice,Bob Eve (1)
allows Alice and Bob to influence Eve, while the policy
Eve Alice,Bob (2)
allows Eve to influence Alice and Bob. We will see that the above two policies
can be combined to allow Alice and Bob to exchange their secrets using Eve as
an intermediary, and providing some fairness guarantees. A different policy that
would allow a similar flow of information is
Alice,Bob,Eve Alice,Bob
Alice Eve
Bob Eve
(3)
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Fig. 5. Security policies, graphically.
that allows Alice, Bob and Eve to influence Alice and Bob, Alice to influence Eve,
and Bob to influence Eve. Intuitively, this can be used to specify that both Alice
and Bob can talk individually to the intermediary Eve, which in turn can talk
to Alice and Bob in coordination with them.
For a clause in A σ B the superscript σ ⊆ C allows one to specify some
additional coordination constraints on the interaction pattern among the levels
in A and B. The superscript d requires all entities in A to influence all the entities
in B directly. For instance, for the policy (1) we might want Alice and Bob to
influence Eve directly, with no delegation among them or to another intermediary.
This leads to the policy Π1 , Alice,Bob d Eve depicted in Figure 5.
In general the flow of information to all of the entities in B is just potential,
i.e., the information is made available to entities in B simultaneously, but it could
happen that after one entity in B acquired the information (some of) the others
get disabled. The superscript f , that stands for “fair” disclosure, prevents the
above to happen: whenever information flows to one of the entities in B, then it
must eventually flow to all other entities in B.
It is worth to remark that the information flowing to the entities in B need
not be the same since causality in our approach represents in general the transfer
of some information. Ensuring that the same information is being transferred
depends on the actual causal semantics under consideration.
In our previous examples, for policies (2) and (3) it is natural to require
fairness to forbid competition among Alice and Bob. This leads to the policies
Π2 and Π3 in Figure 5. Observe that fairness constraints are superfluous when
there is only one security level in the target, like Eve in Π1. Notice that in policy
Π3, the absence of the “direct” constraint allows Eve to act as an intermediary.
A variant of Π3 without intermediary is Π4 , Alice,Bob
d,f Alice,Bob, which
specifies a direct exchange of information between Alice and Bob.
4.2 Semantics of Many-to-Many Policies
In our setting, a security model is an event structure used to capture the structure
of computations and flows. Events correspond to actions of some security level.
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Definition 6 (causal security model). Let L be a set of security levels. A
(causal) security model in L is a pair 〈E , λ〉 where E = 〈E,≤,#〉 is an event
structure and λ : E → L is a security assignment.
The security assignment λ maps each event to a security level and can be
lifted to sets of events: given X ⊆ E we let λX = {A ∈ L | ∃e ∈ X .λ(e) = A}.
For X ⊆ E and A ⊆ L we write X : A if |X| = |A| and λX = A. We write e : A
instead of {e} : {A}. The event structures of Figures 1–3a are security models,
where the security assignment corresponds to the principal annotations.
We next formalise in which sense a clause A σ B justifies a situation in which
we have sets of events X and Y such that X : A, Y : B and the events in X cause
the events in Y . We do this by introducing a semantic counterpart of the relation
σ over sets of events. We first define some properties of sets of events that are
related to the coordination constraints. We say that a set of events X ⊆ E is
flat if [X) is a configuration and for every e, e′ ∈ X it holds e 6< e′. Notice that
when X is flat, all events in X are are enabled at [X). The events in a flat set X
may disable each other or there can be future events that disable some of them
but not the others. We say that X is fair if for all events e, e′ ∈ X and event
e′′ ∈ E, we have e#e′′ iff e′#e′′. Note that in this case, since the events in X
have the same conflicts and conflict is irreflexive, either all or none of them is
executable.
Definition 7 (relation
σ). Let E = 〈E,≤,#〉 be an event structure and let
X,Y ⊆ E. We write
(i) X  Y if X < Y , and Y is flat;
(ii) X
d Y if X  Y and X l Y ;
(iii) X
f Y if X  Y and Y is fair;
(iv) X
d,f Y if X d Y and X f Y .
In words, we write X  Y whenever each event in X is a cause for each
event in Y , and the set Y is flat, ensuring that [Y ) is a configuration enabling
all events in Y .
We write X
d Y when additionally X l Y , i.e., causality is direct, meaning
that delegation is not permitted.
Notice that when X  Y events in Y are all enabled at configuration [Y ),
so that the possibility of getting information from X is granted to all elements
of Y , but once an event in Y is executed other events in Y could get disabled: it
may be the case that the events in Y disable each other or, more generally, they
could be in conflict with different events. The constraint X
f Y , asking that Y
is fair, guarantees, instead, that if the information reaches one of the events in
Y it will eventually reach all of them, or, more formally, that any configuration
intersecting Y extends to a configuration including Y . Note that, in absence of
conflicts, the fairness constraint becomes inessential since it is always trivially
satisfied.
We can now define what it means for a security model to satisfy a policy.
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Π1 ∪Π2 Π3 Π4
P1
P3 X
P2 X X
P4
P5 X
P6 X
Table 1. Models versus policies.
Definition 8 (security). Let Π = 〈L , 〉 be an information flow policy, E =
〈E,≤,#〉 be an event structure, let 〈E , λ〉 be a security model inL . Given X,Y ⊆
E and σ ⊆ C , we say that the clause A σ B ∈ Π allows X σ Y , written
A σ B |= X σ Y if X : A, Y : B.
We say that 〈E , λ〉 satisfies Π or that 〈E , λ〉 is Π-secure, denoted 〈E , λ〉 |= Π,
if for all e, e′ ∈ E such that e l e′ there exist X,Y ⊆ E with e′ ∈ Y such that
X
σ Y and A σ B |= X σ Y for some A σ B ∈ Π such that λ(e) ∈ A.
When λ is clear from the context we sometimes write E |= Π.
Intuitively, a security model satisfies a policy if any direct causality el e′ is
part of a (possibly larger) interaction X
σ Y justified by some clause A σ B of
the policy. We require e′ ∈ Y in order to ensure that the flow to e′ is influenced
by X : A (recall that X < Y ) and thus by all levels in A. On the other hand,
event e is not necessarily in X since the information of level λ(e) that is required
to flow to all levels in B might have been provided by another cause of e′. Still,
since e is a cause of e′, it will be part of any computation involving e′, hence it
will coordinate with the events in X to enable e′. This is fundamental, e.g., to
implement a simultaneous disclosure asynchronously as we shall explain later.
Table 1 summarizes the satisfaction of policies by the protocols of our running
example. The double horizontal lines separate protocols without intermediaries
(P1,P3) from those with intermediaries (P2,P4,P5,P6), and the vertical double
lines separates policies with intermediaries (Π1∪Π2 and Π3) from policies with-
out intermediaries (Π4). We start discussing the scenarios with intermediaries.
The security model of Figure 2b (Protocol P2) satisfies the policies Π1 ∪Π2
and Π3 of Figure 5. For example, the direct causality put〈secA〉@AE : A l
gather〈?sec1, ?sec2〉@AE,BE : E is justified by clause Alice,Bob d Eve of pol-
icy Π1, by choosing X = {put〈secA〉@AE : A, put〈secB〉@BE : B} and Y =
{gather〈?sec1, ?sec2〉@AE,BE : E}. In words, the disclosure to Eve is allowed
since it is collectively made by Alice and Bob. The direct causalities between
the multicast of Eve and the receptions by Alice and Bob are justified by
the clauses in policies Π2 or Π3. In order to see this for the only clause of
Π2, observe that we can choose X = {scatter〈sec2, sec1〉@EA,EB : E} and
Y = {get〈?sec〉@EA : A, get〈?sec〉@EB : B}. In words, both message receptions
of Alice and Bob depend on Eve sending the secrets, and they cannot be disabled,
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put〈secA〉@AE : A put〈secB〉@BE : B
gather〈?sec1,?sec2〉@AE,BE : E
put〈(sec1,sec2)〉@C : E
get〈?sec〉@C : A get〈?sec〉@C : B
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Fig. 6. Secret exchange protocols P4 (left), P5 (center) and P6 (right).
hence they have the same (i.e., no) conflicts. For the only clause of Π3 the situa-
tion is a bit more involved: the idea is to select Y as before and X to be the rest
of the events. Intuitively, Eve acts as a delegated intermediary: the submission of
the secrets by Alice and Bob influence their final receptions, indirectly through
the events of Eve.
Consider now the event structures in Figure 6, which represent variants of
the protocols of our running example where Eve is used as an intermediary.
They can be seen as alternatives to the protocol P2 in Figure 2b. Protocol P4
is like P2 but the intermediary does not scatter the secrets; these are instead
combined in a composite message and sent to a channel C thus creating a conflict
between Alice and Bob since both expect to extract the (combined) secrets from
C. In protocol P5, Eve sends the messages asynchronously with point-to-point
operations, first to Alice and then to Bob. Finally, in P6, the reception of the
secrets is asynchronous, with point-to-point operations.
None of these variants satisfies policy Π1 ∪ Π2. For instance, no clause in
Π1 ∪Π2 justifies the direct causality put〈(sec1, sec2)〉@C : El get〈?sec〉@C : A
in P4 due to the conflict between get〈?sec〉@C : A and get〈?sec〉@C : B. In P5
the direct causalities from Eve’s put events to the get events of Alice and Bob
cannot be justified since there is no Eve-labelled event that is a direct cause for
both get events. Notice that such causalities could be justified if we drop the
directness constraints from the clauses since the reception of the messages by
Bob and Alice are causally dependent by the first put of Eve. Similarly, the direct
causalities from Alice and Bob’s put events to Eve’s get events in P6 cannot be
justified.
The situation is different for Π3. Indeed, both P5 and P6 satisfy the policy.
Intuitively, the asynchronous collection of the secrets in P6 that could not be
justified in Π2 can now be justified since Alice and Bob are allowed to talk to
Eve independently. On the other hand, the asynchronous disclosure by Eve in
P5 is justified since it also depends on both Alice and Bob without directness
constraint.
Similarly, it can be seen that among the protocols not using intermediaries,
namely P1 (Figure 2a) and P3 (Figure 3a), only P3 satisfies the policy Π4.
Protocol P3 is indeed the only one that guarantees that Alice and Bob collectively
make their secrets available to Alice and Bob simultaneously. Indeed, protocol
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P3 has a unique advantage over P1: when Alice (resp. Bob) gets the secrets,
(s)he is not ensured to be in competitive advantage. Clearly, protocol P1 does
not have this property. Therefore, P3 offers a solution to the simultaneous secret
exchange problem with guarantees based on causality rather than on bounds on
the amount of different information obtained by the parties (as e.g. in [8]).
4.3 Semantic properties
We next present some properties of security policies. We first observe that ag-
gregating security levels preserves the satisfaction of policies.
Proposition 1 (soundness of level aggregation). Let 〈E , λ〉 be a security
model in L and ρ : L → L , a total mapping between security levels (possibly
merging some of them). If 〈E , λ〉 |= Π then 〈E , ρ ◦ λ〉 |= ρ(Π).
In the above definition ρ(Π) is the homomorphic lifting of ρ to policies, i.e.,
ρ(Π ∪Π ′) = ρ(Π) ∪ ρ(Π ′), ρ(A σ B) = ρ(A) σ ρ(B) and ρ(∅) = ∅.
Secondly, we discuss how policies can be related according to their strictness.
Definition 9 (strictness relation). The strictness relation v ⊆ P × P is
defined as the least transitive and reflexive relation among policies closed under
Π v Π ′ Π ′1 ⊆ Π1
Π ∪Π1 v Π ′ ∪Π ′1
(Ctx)
σ′ ⊆ σ
A σ′ B v A σ B
(Constr)
A = A′ ∪ A′′
{A′ σ B,A′′ σ B} v A σ B (SplitL)
|B| = 1
A σ∪{f} B v A σ B
(ConstrF)
B = B′ ∪ B′′
{A σ B′,A σ B′′} v A σ B (SplitR)
|A| = |B| = 1
A σ∪{d} B v A σ B
(ConstrD)
The intuition is the following. Rule Ctx says that the strictness relation is
preserved under context closure (i.e., if Π v Π ′ then Π ∪ Π ′′ v Π ′ ∪ Π ′′). In
addition, the relation is preserved even if the weaker policy Π is embedded in a
larger context since the addition of clauses to a policy makes it more permissive.
By rule SplitL if the source A of a clause is split as A′ ∪A′′ then the clause can
be relaxed by replacing it with two clauses having the same coordination con-
straints, the same targets and A′ and A′′, respectively, as sources. This weakens
the policy since any direct causality from an event of level A ∈ A to an event
of level B ∈ B that is justified by A σ B can be justified by A′ σ B or by
A′ σ B. Rule SplitR is analogous, but with the split performed on the target.
Rule Constr says that a clause can be relaxed by removing coordination con-
straints in σ. The last two rules ConstrF and ConstrD capture the fact that
some constraints are trivially satisfied when clauses have a special shape. More
precisely, given a clause A σ B with |B| = 1 the fairness constraint is vacuously
satisfied and this motivates rule ConstrF. If, additionally, |A| = 1 the same
applies to the directness constraint and this leads to rule ConstrD.
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When Π v Π ′ we say that Π is less restrictive than Π ′. For instance, the
policies Π1 and Π2 of our example are less restrictive than Π1∪Π2, and Π1∪Π2
and Π3 are incomparable.
An interesting result is that the strictness relation v is sound and complete
with respect to policy satisfaction.
Proposition 2 (v is sound and complete). Let Π = 〈L , 〉, Π ′ = 〈L , ′〉
be two policies. The following holds
(i) if Π ′ v Π then, for all models 〈E , λ〉 in L , 〈E , λ〉 |= Π implies 〈E , λ〉 |= Π ′;
(ii) if for all models 〈E , λ〉 in L , 〈E , λ〉 |= Π implies 〈E , λ〉 |= Π ′, then Π ′ v Π.
By soundness, whenever Π v Π ′ v Π, the policies Π and Π ′ are equivalent,
i.e., they are satisfied by exactly the same models. Syntactically different policies
can be equivalent because they have clauses that differ for constraints which are
vacuosly satisfied (see rules ConstrF and ConstrD). Moreover, equivalent
policies can differ for the presence of clauses which are useless because they are
subsumed by others (e.g., if a policy includes the clauses A σ B, and A′ σ B,
the addition of a clause A ∪ A′ σ B produces an equivalent policy).
It can be proved that the partial order induced by the preorder (P,v) is a
complete lattice. The (equivalence class of the) policy {(A,C ,A) | A ∈ L } is the
top element (the most restrictive policy, which admits flows within individual
security levels only), and (the equivalence class of) L × ∅ × L is the bottom
element (the most permissive policy, which accepts all flows).
It is interesting to observe that the most restrictive policy satisfied by a
security model does not exist in general. In fact, in order to determine such
policy the idea could be to start with the most permissive policy, allowing for
all binary flows, and keep using the rules (by joining or removing clauses, or
adding coordination constraints) in order to restrict it until no more rules can
be applied. This works, but the policy obtained is not uniquely determined, not
even up to equivalence. For example, consider the security model M on the left
of the figure below.
a :A b :B
c :C
//
zzuuu
u
a′ :A a :A b :B
c :C
""E
EE
E
//
 ||yy
yy
aA b :B
c :C
||yy
yy
and the policies Π1 = (A,B C), (A B) and Π2 = (A B), (B C). Clearly,
M satisfies both Π1 and Π2. Such policies are incomparable with respect to v
(none of them can be obtained from the other by removing or joining classes, and
indeed event structures can be found that satisfy one of them but not the other
like those at the middle and the right of the figure above). Hence Π1 and Π2
are distinct minimal policies satisfied by model M: the most restrictive policy
satisfied by M does not exist.
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4.4 Decidability on Regular Trace Event Structures
The event structure associated with a system exhibiting a cyclic behaviour is
infinite, since events represent “occurrences” of computational steps. Neverthe-
less, we can show that policy satisfaction is decidable once we focus on regular
trace event structures [24], a class of “effectively represented” event structures
enjoying suitable regularity properties. This result relies on the observation that
policy satisfaction can be expressed as a first order property and first order logic
(FOL) is known to be decidable on regular trace event structures [12].
Roughly speaking, for regular trace event structures dependencies are re-
quired to be induced by a finite labelling, endowed with an independence rela-
tion. More precisely, recall that a trace alphabet consists of a pair M = 〈Σ, I〉
where Σ is a finite label alphabet and I ⊆ Σ×Σ is an irreflexive relation called
the independence relation. An M -labelled event structure is an event structure
E , with a labelling function ξ : E → Σ satisfying (1) if e#µe′ then ξ(e) 6= ξ(e′);
(2) if el e′ or e#µe′ then (ξ(e), ξ(e′)) 6∈ I; and (3) if (ξ(e), ξ(e′)) 6∈ I then e ≤ e′
or e#e. Conditions (2) and (3) ensure that the concurrency relation of the event
structure (unordered events that are not in conflict) conforms to the indepen-
dence relation of M . Condition (1) asks that the Σ-labelled transition system
associated with E is deterministic. In addition, as in [12], we require the regular-
ity of the set of (labelled) sequences of execution from the empty configuration
in the event structure, i.e., of the set seq(E) = {σ ∈ Σ∗ | ∅ σ−→∗ C in TS (E)}.
Definition 10 (regular trace event structure). An event structure E is reg-
ular trace if it is M -labelled for some trace alphabet M = 〈Σ, I〉 and seq(E) ⊆ Σ∗
is a regular language.
When we need to make the trace alphabet explicit, we say that the event struc-
ture E is M -regular trace. The class of regular trace event structures is quite
general. In [23] it has been shown to coincide with the class of event structures
associated with finite safe Petri nets by the unfolding construction [16].
We first instantiate the notion of regularity in the setting of security models.
Definition 11 (regular trace model). A security model 〈E , λ〉 in L is reg-
ular trace if there exists a trace alphabet M = 〈Σ, I〉 such that E is M -regular
trace via the labelling ξ : E → Σ and λ = λ′ ◦ ξ for some λ′ : Σ → L.
The encoding of policy satisfaction as a FOL sentence crucially relies on the
fact that, in order to check whether a causal dependency a l b is justified by
some clause A σ B, we need to find sets of events X : A, Y : B with bounded
cardinality |X| = |A| and |Y | = |B|. Then decidability follows from [12].
Proposition 3 (decidability on regular trace security models). Let Π =
〈L , 〉 be an information flow policy and let 〈E , λ〉 be a regular trace security
model in L . The decision problem 〈E , λ〉 |= Π is decidable.
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5 Non-Interference
We discuss in this section how our causality-based notion of information flow
compares with notions of information flow based on non-interference for con-
current systems. The key differentiating factor resides in the semantic model:
causal semantics are normally finer than interleaving semantics. The paradig-
matic example is given by processes a | b and a.b+ b.a which are equated in an
interleaving world but are different from a causal point of view. Hence we would
expect our notion of security, when confined to binary policies, to be more re-
strictive than those based on interleaving semantics. However, this is not always
the case mainly because observational non-interference approaches capture flows
of information due to conflicts (i.e., branching), which are instead not considered
in our notion of security. We will also briefly discuss how our approach could be
amended to consider conflict-related flows.
Consider, for example Strong Non-deterministic Non-Interference
(SNNI) [6,7,3]. Informally, a system S is SNNI whenever S \ H (i.e., the
low level system in isolation) and S/H (i.e., the entire system where high H
actions are unobservable) are weak trace equivalent. Let us say that an event
structure E is SNNI whenever its transition system TS (E) is SNNI. Then it is
easy to see that {L  H}-security is strictly finer than SNNI. The easiest case
is to show that SNNI does not imply {L  H}-security. The counterexample is
the event structure E0 below:
l : L h : H
l ′ : L

∅
{l} {h}
{l, h, l′}
l
zzuuu
u h
$$II
II
l
∅
{l}
{c}
l
zzuuu
u ∅
{l} {h}
{l, h, l′}
l
zzuuu
u τ
$$II
II
l
E0 TS(E0) TS(E0) \ H TS(E0)/H
Clearly E0 is SNNI since the set of traces of both E0 \ H and E0/H is {, l}, but
E0 is not {L H}-secure since the direct causality hl l′ cannot be justified.
On the other hand, {L H}-security implies SNNI: if E0 is {L H}-secure
then it contains no direct causality ele′ with e : L and e′ : H, and hence all traces
are such that high transitions are never necessarily followed by low transitions.
Hence, the traces of E0 \ H and the traces of E0/H coincide.
Observational non-interference properties are expressive enough to capture
information leakages arising from deadlocks and divergence. Particularly popular
in this tradition are notions based on weak bisimulation, like the Bisimulation-
based SNNI (BSNNI) and the finer Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on
Compositions (BNDC) [6,7]. BSNNI is like SNNI but with weak bisimulation
equivalence instead of trace equivalence. Note that BSNNI and {L H}-security
are incomparable. First, it is easily seen that {L  H}-security does not imply
BSNNI.
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l : L h : H
c
∅
{l} {h}
l
zzuuu
u h
$$II
II ∅
{l}
l
zzuuu
u ∅
{l} {h}
l
zzuuu
u τ
$$II
II
E1 TS(E1) TS(E1) \ H TS(E1)/H
The event structure E1 above is {L H}-secure (since there is no direct causality
between l and h) but is not BSNNI, since TS (E1)\H and TS (E1)/H are not weak
bisimilar. Informally, the low part of the system can deduce that h occurred by
observing that l is not executable. Vice versa, one can show that BSNNI does
not imply {L H}-security. Consider the event structure E2 below.
l : L h : H
h ′ : H l ′ : L
 
∅
{l} {h}
{l, h′} {h, l′}
l
zzuuu
u h
$$II
II
h l
∅
{l}
l
zzuuu
u
∅
{l} {h}
{l, h′} {h, l′}
l
zzuuu
u τ
$$II
II
τ l
E2 TS(E2) TS(E2) \ H TS(E2)/H
Clearly, E2 is not {L H}-secure since the direct causality hl l′ is not allowed.
On the other hand, E2 is BNNI since TS (E2)\H and TS (E2)/H are weak bisimilar.
For similar reasons, our notion of security is also incomparable to other obser-
vational notions of non-interference based on transition systems such as BNDC
and those that extend [18] by requiring the source and the target states of every
high transition to be (low) trace equivalent [1,7,9].
6 Related Work
Logic-based languages have been investigated as flexible formalisms to ex-
press security properties. We mention, e.g., hyperproperties [5] and their logics
(e.g. [4,15]). Our policies can be easily integrated in logic-based languages to
obtain a richer policy language. For instance, the simplest solution is to combine
our policies by using standard propositional operators.
Another example is Paralocks [2], a language for specifying role-based infor-
mation flow policies. In Paralocks a data item x can be annotated with clauses
of the form Σ → a, specifying the conditions Σ under which x can flow into
actor a. Such policies can be related to many-to-one policies in our approach,
i.e., of the form A1 . . .Am  B1. It less clear how many-to-many policies, i.e.,
policies stating that data can flow to an agent a if it also flows to an agent b,
could be expressed in Paralocks.
In addition to FOL and MSO for event structures [12], our work can be
related to other logics motivated by causality. An example is Event Order Logic
(EOL) of [10], a logic based language used to specify boolean conditions on the
occurrence of events, with applications to safety analysis. EOL is inspired by
Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) and introduces ad-hoc operators to specify
the order of events. The more relevant operator is ψ1 ∧. ψ2 which allows one
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to express that the events described by ψ1 occur before those described by ψ2.
Hence, a policy A1 . . .Am  B1 . . .Bn can be related to an EOL formula A1 ∨
. . . ∨ Am ∧. B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bn. However, EOL does not feature operators to express
some of our coordination constraints.
7 Conclusion
We have presented a novel approach to many-to-many information flow policies
that allows one to specify patterns of coordination among several security levels.
In particular, each clause in a policy can specify that a certain set of levels is
allowed to cooperate to provide the flow collectively, and possibly simultaneously
to another set of security levels. We believe that the approach can turn useful
in several scenarios including secret exchange protocols, security architectures
and systems with controlled forms of declassification. We have provided decid-
ability results and discussed the relation to some traditional notions of security,
including observational non-interference and language-based security. We are
currently investigating the development of verification and enforcement mecha-
nisms for concrete specification languages, like programming languages and Petri
nets. We are also investigating extensions of our work in several directions, in-
cluding how to suitably deal with indirect flows of information due to conflicts,
and how to deal with the transfer of specific values.
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